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PARTIALLY DISABLED AND RELIGIOUS: VIRGINIA
WORKERS' COMPENSATION AND THE FREE EXERCISE
CLAUSE
I. INTRODUCTION
The Virginia Workers' Compensation Act denies wage loss
benefits to partially disabled employees who unjustifiably reject
employment procured by their employer which is within their
remaining work capacity.1 Section 65.2-510 of the Virginia Code
provides that "[i]f an injured employee refuses employment
procured for him suitable to his capacity, he shall only be enti-
tled to the benefits provided for in section 65.2-603 during the
continuance of such refusal, unless in the opinion of the Com-
mission such refusal was justified."2 Essentially, unjustified
refusal of selective employment within the employee's work
capacity results in a suspension in wage loss benefits until the
employee cures the refusal by either accepting the offered job or
finding employment on his or her own.'
An employee, however, may defend his or her refusal of selec-
tive employment by showing that the denial was justified. The
initial burden rests with the employer to show that the offered
1. VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-510 (1991); see also Washington Metro. Area Auth. v.
Harrison, 228 Va. 598, 324 S.E.2d 654 (1985). Employers are under no statutory duty
to procure selective employment for injured employees. However, benefits will be
suspended when an employee refuses selective employment only if the employer pro-
vided the refused job. Big D Quality Homebuilders v. Hamilton, 228 Va. 378, 322
S.E.2d 839 (1984).
2. Id. Benefits under Virginia Code § 65.2-603 include medical care, rehabilita-
tion, and vocational training. Id. § 65.2-603.
3. Thompson v. Hampton Inst., 3 Va. App. 668, 353 S.E.2d 316 (1987); K & L
Trucking Co. v. Thurber, 1 Va. App. 213, 337 S.E.2d 299 (1985).
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employment is within the employee's residual work capacity.
Once this requirement is met, the burden shifts to the employ-
ee to show that his or her refusal to work is justified.4 If the
employee establishes justification cognizable under the Virginia
Workers' Compensation Act for the refusal of employment, then
he or she retains wage loss benefits.5 The Virginia Workers'
Compensation Commission has stated that factors such as liv-
ing and travel expenses will be considered in determining
whether a refusal of selective employment is justified.' The
Commission, however, has not regarded certain factors, such as
the inability to arrange for child care,' the potential loss of
union pension benefits,' or an aversion to certain working
hours,9 to be adequate justification for refusing selective
employment.
On January 29, 1992, the Commission again refused to widen
the range of factors accepted for justification. Holding that not
accepting employer procured selective employment because the
job requirements would force the employee to abandon his or
her religious practices does not constitute a justified refusal
under the Act, the Commission suspended an employee's wage
loss benefits."0 The Virginia Court of Appeals affirmed the
Commission's decision," in Baliweg v. Crowder Contracting,
agreeing that the termination of Workers' Compensation bene-
fits because an employee refuses to abandon his or her religious
4. American Furn. v. Doan, 230 Va. 39, 41, 334 S.E.2d 548, 550 (1985) (citing
Klate Holt Co. v. Holt, 229 Va. 544, 547, 331 S.E.2d 446, 448 (1985)); Talley v.
Goodwin Brothers, 224 Va. 48, 52, 294 S.E.2d 818, 820 (1982). To show justification,
the grounds for refusing selective employment must be "such that a reasonable person
desirous of employment would have refused the offered work." Additionally, "the de-
termination of justification to refuse employment involves 'a much broader inquiry
than merely considering whether the intrinsic aspects of the job are acceptable to the
prospective employee."' Instead, "Ij]ustification to refuse an offer of selective employ-
ment 'may arise from factors totally independent of those criteria used to determine
whether a job is suitable to a particular employee." Food Lion, Inc. v. Lee, 16 Va.
App. 616, 619, 431 S.E.2d 342, 344 (1993) (quoting Johnson v. Virginia Employment
Comm'n, 8 Va. App. 441, 452, 382 S.E.2d 476, 481 (1989)).
5. See Doan, 230 Va. at 42-43, 334 S.E.2d at 550-51.
6. Guthrie v. Ken Hurst Firearms Engraving Co., 65 O.I.C. 221 (1986).
7. Mason v. Phillip Morris, U.S.A., 60 O.I.C. 296 (1981).
8. Reynolds v. Gust K Newburg Const. Co., 70 O.I.C. 236 (1991).
9. Emmerson v. Marshall Lodge Memorial Hosp., 51 O.I.C. 87 (1969).





doctrines is not a violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment.12 The Virginia Supreme Court, however,
reversed the decision rendered by the Court of Appeals and
held that requiring Ballweg to violate his religious beliefs to
receive Workers' Compensation benefits violates the Free Exer-
cise Clause."3 This paper will consider whether courts should
find that requiring injured workers to accept employment under
conditions that conflict with their religious convictions in order
to retain wage loss benefits under the Workers' Compensation
Act violates the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause. Part
II will present the requisite constitutional history of the Free
Exercise Clause. Part HI will critique the Ballweg decision
itself, examining the opinions of the Workers' Compensation
Commission and the Court of Appeals. Part IV will analyze the
decision of the Virginia Supreme Court and consider whether
the court applied the appropriate constitutional standards. Fi-
nally, part V concludes that if, under a statutory scheme that
provides for individualized exemptions, the Commonwealth
determines the recipients of those exemptions, and in doing so
burdens an individual's ability to practice his or her religion,
the application of the statute will be subjected to the highest
judicial scrutiny.
II. THE FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution
reads: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... "4 The
Supreme Court's interpretation of what "free exercise" encom-
passes has shifted and swayed over the past 115 years and has
come nearly full circle.
A. Conduct v. Belief
In Reynolds v. United States," perhaps the earliest notable
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause, the Supreme Court
12. Id. at 35, 427 S.E.2d at 733.
13. Ballweg v. Crowder Contracting Co., 247 Va. 205, 440 S.E.2d 613 (1994).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
15. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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upheld a federal law outlawing polygamy. The Court noted that
the petitioner, a member of the Mormon church, was duty
bound to practice polygamy by his religion." The Court looked
to the founders, namely the writings of Jefferson and Madison,
to construe the meaning of the free exercise protection. Specifi-
cally, the Court quoted Jefferson: "[Tihe legislative powers of
the government reach actions only." 7 The Court accepted this
statement as an "authoritative declaration of the scope and
effect of the amendment," 8 and held that "Congress was de-
prived of all legislative power over mere opinion, but was left
free to reach actions which were in violation of social duties or
subversive of good order."9
The Court explained that if exemptions from general laws
were required for each individual whose religious beliefs con-
flicted with the regulation, society as a whole would suffer. As
the Court stated, to hold that Congress could not control ac-
tions "would be to make the professed doctrines of religious
belief superior to the law of the land, and, in effect to make
every citizen to become a law unto himself.""
Thus, in Reynolds the Court dramatically limited the scope of
Free Exercise Clause protections. Congress could pass laws
significantly limiting an individual's ability to practice his or
her religion so long as the regulation was aimed only at con-
duct and not at belief.
B. The Move Away From Reynolds Toward the Protection of
Conduct
During most of the twentieth century, the Court broadened
the scope of Free Exercise Clause protections to include con-
duct. In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,2
the Court overruled its decision in Minersville School District v.
Gobitis" and held that a state statute requiring children in
16. Id. at 161.
17. Id. at 164.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 166-67.
21. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
22. 310 U.S. 586 (1940). In Gobitis, two Jehovah's Witness children were expelled
766 [Vol. 28:763
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public schools to salute and pledge allegiance to the national
flag violated the First Amendment when such conduct was
prohibited by the children's religious beliefs.' The Barnette
court declared that "[t]he very purpose of a Bill of Rights was
to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political
controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied
by the courts."' Justice Jackson, writing for the Court, assert-
ed "[o]ne's right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a
free press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other funda-
mental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend on the
outcome of no elections."25 Accordingly, First Amendment
rights can be restricted only "to prevent grave and immediate
danger to interests which the State may lawfully protect."26
Jackson concluded, stating "[ilf there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty,
can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism,
[or] religion ... ."27
The precise implication of Barnette on the Free Exercise
Clause is ambiguous because it represented a meshing of free
exercise and free speech issues. It is unclear whether the Court
would have applied the same scrutiny if only free exercise is-
sues had been involved. However, Justice's Jackson's sweeping
language does indicate a departure from the rigid conduct/belief
distinction of Reynolds.
from school for not complying with the Board of Education's requirement that they
salute and pledge allegiance to the national flag. Id. at 591. Writing for the majority
in Gobitis, Justice Frankfurter explained that "[c]onscientious scruples have not, in
the course of the long struggle for religious toleration, relieved the individual from
obedience to a general law not aimed at the promotion or restriction of religious be-
liefs." Id. at 594.
23. 319 U.S. at 624.
24. Id. at 638.
25. Id. (emphasis added).
26. Id. at 639.
27. Id. at 642.
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C. The Unemployment Compensation Cases and Strict Scrutiny
If Barnette was an incremental step toward the protection of
religious conduct, the 1963 case of Sherbert v. Verner' repre-
sents a giant leap in Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence. In
Sherbert, a Seventh-day Adventist lost her job because she
would not work on Saturday, the Sabbath for her religion.'
After failing to find other employment meeting the require-
ments of her faith, the employee sought unemployment compen-
sation benefits under the South Carolina Unemployment Com-
pensation Act."0 The law stated that to receive compensation
benefits an employee must be "able to work ... available for
work ... [and not] failed, without good cause ... to accept
available suitable work when offered him by the employment
office or the employer."3' Determining that the refusal to work
on Saturday, albeit due to religious convictions, did not consti-
tute a good faith denial of employment offered by the employer,
the South Carolina Employment Security Commission denied
the employee benefits.3 This decision was ultimately affirmed
by the South Carolina Supreme Court.33
In its analysis, the Court first considered whether stripping
unemployment benefits places any burden on Free Exercise
rights. The Court noted that denying benefits is not as great a
burden on religion as the imposition of criminal sanctions for
religious activity. 4 However, the Court recognized that in de-
nying benefits, the State forced the employee to choose between
practicing her' religion and accepting benefits.3' According to
the Court, "[glovernmental imposition of such a choice puts the
same kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would
a fine imposed against appellant for her Saturday worship." 6
28. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
29. Id. at 399.
30. Id. at 399-400.
31. Id. at 400-01 (quoting S.C. CODE ANN., §§ 68-113(3), 68-114 (Law. Co-op.
1962)).
32. Id. at 401.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 403.




The majority asserted it was inconsequential that unemploy-
ment benefits are not a "right" but merely a "privilege."3 7 As
Justice Brennan explained, "[i]t is too late in the day to doubt
that the liberties of religion and expression may be infringed by
the denial of or placing of conditions on a benefit or privi-
lege."3" Placing such a condition on the procurement of benefits
"upon this appellant's willingness to violate a cardinal piinciple
of her religious faith effectively penalizes the free exercise of
her constitutional liberties."39
After determining that a burden on the Free Exercise Clause
existed, the Court applied the strictest level of scrutiny to the
free exercise claim. Any infringement upon the employee's free
exercise rights could be "justified [only] by a 'compelling state
interest in the regulation of a subject within the State's consti-
tutional power to regulate."'
40
Noting that "[o]nly the gravest abuses, endangering para-
mount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation"41 of
constitutional guarantees, the Court determined that the denial
of compensation benefits had violated the employee's constitu-
tional rights.42 Although the State asserted it had an interest
in preventing the dilution of its unemployment compensation
fund by claimants "feigning" religious objections, Justice
Brennan was not convinced that this interest was sufficiently
compelling.' Brennan suggests that only if requiring the ex-
ception presented "an administrative problem of such magni-
37. Id.
38. Id. (citing Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 191-92 (1952); American Com-
munications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 390 (1950); Hannegan v. Esquire, Inc., 327
U.S. 146, 155-56 (1946)) (footnote omitted).
39. Id. at 406.
40. Id. at 403 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
41. Id. at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1944)).
42. According to Justice Brennan, granting Sherbert benefits did not raise Estab-
lishment Clause concerns because doing so favored no particular religion and did not
entangle the government with religious institutions. Brennan further explained that
the holding did not create a blanket rule that all persons whose religious convictions
result in their unemployment are entitled to benefits, and that the decision did not
mandate a specific unemployment compensation scheme for the states to adopt. Id. at
409-10. As Justice Brennan stated: "Our holding ... is only that South Carolina may
not constitutionally apply the eligibility provisions so as to constrain a worker to
abandon his religious convictions respecting the day of rest." Id. at 410.
43. Id.
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tude, or ... afford[ed] the exempted class so great a competi-
tive advantage, that such a requirement would have rendered
the entire statutory scheme unworkable" would the State be
justified in denying benefits."
After Sherbert, once it was determined that a burden on the
free exercise of religion existed, the state had to establish that
a compelling interest justified the burden and that the regula-
tion was the least restrictive alternative. 5 No longer was the
Court bound by the conduct/belief distinction of Reynolds.
Sherbert's strict scrutiny protection was applied nearly ten
years later in Wisconsin v. Yoder." Amish parents sought ex-
emptions from Wisconsin's mandatory school attendance policy
claiming infringement of their free exercise rights. The parents
believed that if their children attended high school, they would
risk ostracization from their community and imperil their
children's salvation.47 According to the Amish religion, higher
education creates attitudes that separate one from God." The
Court noted that Dr. John Hostetler, an expert on Amish soci-
ety, testified that compulsory high school attendance could
cause psychological harm to the Amish children and possibly
lead to the destruction of the Old Order Amish Church." The
State stipulated that the parents generally held their religious
beliefs. °
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, explained that
although the State must have the power to regulate certain
types of religious conduct, "there are areas of conduct protected
by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and are
thus beyond the power of the State to control, even under regu-
lations of general applicability."5 Burger observed that the
Court has "rejected" the notion that conduct is beyond the pro-
tection of the Free Exercise Clause. 2 The Court also noted
44. Id. at 408-09.
45. Id. at 403-05.
46. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
47. Id. at 209.
48. Id. at 212.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 209.




that it was irrelevant that the Wisconsin statute did not dis-
criminate against religion on its face. "A regulation neutral on
its face may, in its application," the Court explained, "nonethe-
less offend the constitutional requirement for governmental
neutrality if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion."'
The Court acknowledged that the State had a strong interest
in promoting a system of compulsory education.' Because the
State did not establish how its "admittedly strong interest in
compulsory education would be adversely affected by granting
an exemption to the Amish" for religious reasons, however, the
Court affirmed the Wisconsin Supreme Court's holding that
imposing the State's compulsory education requirement on
Amish children violated the Free Exercise Clause.55
The Yoder holding underscored Sherbert by emphasizing that
the Free Exercise Clause protects religion-based conduct from
facially-neutral, generally applicable laws if granting a religious
exemption would not substantially interfere with the State's
statutory scheme.
An example of where a religion-based exemption intolerably
interfered with the state's legitimate interests arose in United
States v. Lee.56 In Lee, an Old Order Amish farmer objected to
paying social security taxes for his hired help, who were also
Amish, for sincere religious reasons. 7 The Court explained
that the application of the generally applicable statute to Lee
passed strict scrutiny because the State established that the tax
was necessary to achieve an overriding interest and that "man-
53. Id.
54. Id. at 221.
55. Id. at 236. The Court explained that "we must searchingly examine the inter-
ests that the State seeks to promote by its requirement for compulsory education ...
and the impediment to those objectives that would flow from recognizing the claimed
Amish exemption." Id. at 221. The State asserted that the compulsory education re-
quirement promoted the interest of developing citizens who are able to competently
participate in the political process and who are self-reliant. Although it agreed with
the State's contention, the Court stated that forcing the Amish children to attend
high school would not advance the State's asserted interests because Amish children
needed only to be prepared to function in the Amish community, not modem society.
Id. at 221-22.
56. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
57. Id. at 254-55. The Amish opposed paying social security taxes because they
believed that it was sinful for individuals not to care for their own poor and elderly.
Id. at 255.
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datory participation [in the program was] indispensable" to
accomplish the state's interests.58
In the 1980's, three unemployment compensation cases,
Thomas v. Review Board,59 Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals
Commission; and Frazee v. Illinois Employment Security
Department,6 further clarified and underscored the Sherbert
holding.
In Thomas v. Review Board, Thomas worked in his
employer's roll foundry manufacturing sheet steel for various
uses. 2 When the foundry closed, the employer transferred the
employee to a department which fabricated turrets for military
tanks. Thomas claimed that his religious beliefs prohibited him
from taking part in the production of armaments. When he was
unable to find alternate work within the employer's factory,
Thomas requested to be laid off.63 The employer denied this
request and Thomas resigned.'
Thomas then sought unemployment compensation benefits
under the Indiana Employment Security Act. At the administra-
tive hearing, Thomas testified that it was against his religion to
participate in the production of armaments.65 Although the
hearing officer acknowledged that the "claimant did quit due to
his religious convictions," the officer determined that this rea-
son did not constitute "good cause" as required by the Indiana
statute.66 Consequently, the Review Board denied Thomas ben-
efits. 7 The Supreme Court of Indiana ruled that, because
Thomas "quit voluntarily for personal reasons," he did not qual-
ify for benefits.'
Relying on Sherbert v. Verner, the United States Supreme
Court reversed the Indiana court. The Court rejected the Indi-
58. Id. at "57-59.
59. 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
60. 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
61. 489 U.S. 829 (1989).
62. 450 U.S. at 709.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 710.
65. Id. at 711.
66. Id. at 712.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 713.
[Vol. 28:763772
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ana Review Board's contention that because Thomas' religious
liberty had been burdened indirectly by a neutral law, no free
exercise violation existed. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the
Court, explained:
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit
upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it
denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by reli-
gious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an
adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a
burden upon religion exists. While the compulsion may be
indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is nonetheless
substantial. 9
Finding a burden upon Thomas' free exercise rights, the court
applied the Sherbert strict scrutiny test. The Court recognized
Indiana's legitimate interests in preventing widespread unem-
ployment by allowing individuals to leave jobs for personal
reasons and in avoiding investigations by employers into job
applicants' religious convictions.70 These interests, however,
were not found compelling to justify the inroad on religious
freedom. The Court determined the record did not establish
that the number of persons leaving employment for religious
reasons or employer investigations would be substantial enough
to endanger the State's legitimate interests.7' Therefore, over
thirty years after Sherbert, the Court re-affirmed its conviction
that conditioning benefits upon the neglect of religious convic-
tions by a facially-neutral statute constitutes a violation of the
Free Exercise Clause.
Six years later in Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Commis-
sion, the Court again applied the Sherbert test and held that
the denial of unemployment compensation benefits to a Sev-
enth-day Adventist who would not work on Saturdays violated
the Free Exercise Clause.72
69. Id. at 717-18.
70. Id. at 718-19.
71. Id.
72. 480 U.S. 136 (1987). In Hobbie, the appellant converted to the Seventh-day
Adventist Church after working over two years for the employer. Only after this
conversion did the employee's religious beliefs conflict with her employment duties.
The employer fired Hobbie, and the Florida Bureau of Unemployment Compensation
denied the employee unemployment compensation benefits. Id. at 138-39. The Court
1994] 773
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Finally, in Frazee v. Illinois Department of Employment Secu-
rity, decided in March of 1989, the Court once again considered
whether refusing to work on one's Sabbath was protected by
the Free Exercise Clause.73 Frazee was distinguishable from
Sherbert, Thomas, and Hobbie in that Frazee did not belong to
a recognized religious sect.74 The state court found that an
exemption from Illinois' generally applicable law was warranted
only when it conflicted with the practices of an "established
religious sect."
75
The Supreme Court rejected the State's distinction, holding
that all that is required for a free exercise claim is a sincere
religious conviction.7" Applying Sherbert's strict scrutiny test,
the Court acknowledged the State's interest in preventing a
halt in the economy on the Sabbath. Reiterating the logic of
Thomas, however, the Court explained that the number of those
finding a conflict between their religion and working on Sunday
was not proven to be substantial enough to warrant an in-
fringement of Frazee's constitutional rights.77
Therefore, after Frazee, the Reynolds analysis appeared to be
abandoned. Regardless of whether a statute was facially neutral
and generally applicable, whether the penalty for religious con-
duct was direct or indirect, or whether the burden on religion
was the stripping of a right or privilege, the Sherbert strict
scrutiny test applied once a burden on the free exercise of reli-
gion was shown.
found the fact that Hobbie converted to her religion after commencing her employ-
ment to be "immaterial," explaining "[tihe First Amendment protects the free exercise
rights of employees who adopt religious beliefs or convert from one faith to another
after they are hired." Id. at 144.
73. 489 U.S. 829 (1989).
74. When seeking review of his denial of benefits by the Illinois Division of Un-
employment Insurance, Frazee explained that he "refused the job which required
[him] to work on Sunday based on Biblical principles, scripture Exodus 20:8, 9, 10.
Remember the Sabbath day by keeping it holy." Id. at 833 n.1.
75. Id. at 831.
76. Id. at 834.
77. Id. at 835.
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D. The Revitalization of Reynolds and Congress' Reaction
In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v.
Smith,78 the respondents were fired from their jobs at a drug
rehabilitation facility because it was discovered that they in-
gested "peyote" during a religious ceremony of the Native Amer-
ican Church. Under Oregon law, peyote is defined as a con-
trolled substance, possession of which constitutes a Class B
felony. Although respondents were members of the church and
peyote ingestion was a part of their religious practice, the Ore-
gon Employment Division found that the respondents were fired
for misconduct, rendering them ineligible for unemployment
benefits.79 The Supreme Court refused to apply the Sherbert
strict scrutiny test and held that the State could burden the
respondents' religious conduct. Justice Scalia, writing for the
Court, explained that the Sherbert test is properly applied in
unemployment compensation cases where the state "conditioned
the availability of benefits upon an applicant's willingness to
work under conditions forbidden by his religion."" Scalia noted
that in unemployment compensation cases, the Sherbert test
"was developed in a context that lent itself to individualized
governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant con-
duct."8' According to Scalia, the Sherbert test is appropriate
where "the State has in place a system of individual exemp-
tions, [and] it may not refuse to extend that system to cases of
'religious hardship' without compelling reason."82
Essentially, the rule announced by the Court in Smith was
that the government cannot outlaw "acts or abstentions only
when they are engaged in for religious reasons."' The govern-
ment cannot directly burden religious practices." Scalia also
78. 494 u.s. 872 (1990).
79. Id. at 874.
80. Id. at 883.
81. Id. at 884.
82. Id. (citing Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 708 (1986)). Justice Scalia explained
that "a distinctive feature of unemployment compensation programs is that their eligi-
bility criteria invite consideration of the particular circumstances behind an
applicant's unemployment." Id.
83. Id. at 877.
84. Id. at 877-78.
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stated that exemptions from neutral, generally applicable laws
are required only when other fundamental rights such as free
speech are involved." Moreoever, the Sherbert test only ap-
plies to cases where "the State has in place a system of individ-
ual exemptions."" Therefore, unless the above mentioned con-
ditions exist, facially neutral, generally applicable laws pass
constitutional muster, and exemptions for religious reasons are
not required under Smith.87
Thus, Smith significantly limited the applicability of the
Sherbert strict scrutiny analysis. Religious conduct, if only indi-
rectly affected by a facially neutral statute, could be burdened
by the government.
In a concurring opinion in Smith, Justice O'Connor stated
that the majority's holding "dramatically departs from well-
settled First Amendment jurisprudence .. . and is incompatible
with our Nation's fundamental commitment to individual reli-
gious liberty."8 This sentiment was echoed by Congress in
1993. On October 27, 1993, Congress passed the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act.89 The stated purpose of the Act is "to
restore the compelling interest test as set forth in Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where
free exercise of religion is substantially burdened."" The Act
provides that the government cannot "substantially burden" the
free exercise of religion unless the government establishes that
the application of the burden "is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest" and "is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest."9
Therefore, four years after Smith, Congress reversed the deci-
sion by legislation and restored the application of the Sherbert
test to situations where religious conduct is threatened by gov-
ernmental action.92
85. Id. at 881.
86. Id, at 884.
87. Id. at 872.
88. Id. at 891.




92. Apparently, Congress has the authority to take such action, and has done so
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HI. BALLWEG V. CROWDER CONTRACTING C0. 93
When the Virginia Workers' Compensation Commission de-
nied an employee benefits because he refused to accept employ-
er procured selective employment due to a conflict with his reli-
gious practices, an interesting opportunity to analyze the vitali-
ty of Sherbert principles in the wake of Smith presented itself.
A. The State Agency Decisions
In Baliweg v. Crowder Contracting Co., Thomas F. Ballweg
sustained an injury at work on June 8, 1989. The Virginia In-
dustrial Commission (now the Virginia Workers' Compensation
Commission) found this injury compensable under the Virginia
Workers' Compensation Act and awarded the claimant compen-
sation benefits for intermittent periods of incapacity through
March 14, 1991.'
Ballweg re-injured his knee at work in December, 1990, and
his treating physician determined that the employee was par-
tially disabled. 5 One month later, his employer obtained the
services of a vocational rehabilitation specialist to find employ-
ment for Ballweg meeting his physical restrictions. Considering
these restrictions as well as Ballweg's vocational aptitude and
interests, the employer's vocational rehabilitation specialist
found a position for Ballweg in electronic security.96 Ballweg
interviewed for the position and discovered that it required him
to work on Saturdays. Consequently, Ballweg refused the posi-
tion because working on Saturday was prohibited by his reli-
gious convictions as a member of the Seventh-day Adventist
Church.
97
in the past. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, for example, essentially reversed a Su-
preme Court decision upholding a North Carolina statute requiring literacy tests for
voter registration. See Philip Spare, Comment, Free Exercise of Religion: A New
Translation, 96 DicK. L. REV. 705, 731 (1992).
93. 247 Va. 205, 440 S.E.2d 613 (1994).
94. Ballweg v. Crowder Contracting Co., 16 Va. App. 31, 33, 427 S.E.2d 731, 732
(1993).
95. Ballweg v. Crowder Contracting Co., VWC File No. 140-74-04 (Opinion of
Deputy Commissioner Phillips, Oct. 9, 1991) at 97.
96. Id. at 97.
97. Id.
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The employer discontinued Ballweg's compensation because of
his refusal to accept the selective employment. In a September
10, 1991 hearing before the Virginia Workers' Compensation
Commission, Ballweg sought temporary total disability bene-
fits.9" The employer defended Ballweg's claim under Virginia
Code section 65.2-510, asserting that it had procured employ-
ment within the employee's capacity and that Ballweg had
unjustifiably refused this employment.99
Thus, the issue before the Virginia Workers' Compensation
Commission was whether Ballweg's refusal of selective employ-
ment procured by the employer because of his religious convic-
tions constituted a justified refusal under the Workers' Compen-
sation Act. Looking to Sherbert and Thomas, the Deputy Com-
missioner presiding at the Workers' Compensation hearing
stated that "[1ike Sherbert and Thomas before him, Ballweg is
precluded by his religious beliefs from working under certain
conditions."00 Consequently, the Deputy Commissioner opined
that "Ballweg's refusal of the position .. . was justified and to
find otherwise would result in a violation of the claimant's
constitutional rights as protected by the First Amendment."'O'
The employer appealed the decision of the Deputy Commis-
sioner to the full Workers' Compensation Commission.' The
Commission noted that Ballweg did not lack the physical ability
to perform the position found by the employer. Instead,
Ballweg's religious convictions were the sole cause of his refusal
to work.'0 ' Thus according to the Commission, because the
employee was offered employment within his physical capacity,
he had the burden to show that his refusal was justified before
he could receive compensation for work incapacity.' 4
Citing Mason v. Phillip Morris' and Emmerson v. Mar-
shall Lodge Memorial Hospital,"6 the Commission observed
98. Id. at 96-97.
99. See id. at 98.
100. Id. at 100.
101. Id.
102. Ballweg v. Crowder Contracting Co., 71 O.W.C. 279 (1992).
103. Id. at 280.
104. Id.
105. 60 O.I.C. 296 (1981).
106. 51 O.I.C. 87 (1969).
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that reasons such as the inability to find child care or undesir-
able working hours traditionally do not constitute justified ra-
tionales for refusing employer-secured selective employment.
Instead, "[tihese decisions are based on findings that the wage
loss being suffered by the claimant is no longer attributable to
any physical disability flowing from the injury." °7 The Com-
mission continued by stating that the employer "is not responsi-
ble for conditions that are not causally related to the claimant's
injury which prevent him from accepting selective employ-
ment."' ' Consequently, because Ballweg's reason for refusing
the selective employment did not constitute a justified refusal
under Virginia Workers' Compensation law, he could receive
compensation benefits only if his refusal was protected by the
Free Exercise Clause.
Drawing a dubious distinction between the Sherbert line of
cases and Ballweg's dilemma, the Commission rejected the
Deputy Commissioner's findings. The Commission explained
that Sherbert and Thomas, which dealt with unemployment
compensation benefits, were not analogous to Ballweg's case
because "workers' compensation benefits . . .are directed by the
State through funds provided exclusively by the employer or its
[insurance] carrier."0 9 Because the employer or its insurance
carrier directly paid for the benefits instead of the State, the
Commission declared "we are not willing to make a finding that
the Workers' Compensation Act is depriving him of his freedom
to worship as he pleases.""0 The Commission did, however,
recognize that "[ilt may be that the claimant must make a
difficult decision because of his religious fidelity and his need
for compensation benefits .. .
B. The Virginia Court of Appeals
In affirming the Workers' Compensation Commission's hold-
ing, the Virginia Court of Appeals first observed that workers'
compensation law is not a development of and is often contrary
107. 71 O.W.C. at 281.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 280.
110. Id. at 281.
111. Id. at 280-81.
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to common law."' Apparently because of this and in light of
the fact that "[n]o statutory provision permits the commission
to hold that an employee's religion exempts him from accepting
selective employment," the court of appeals determined that it
would not "interfere with the statutory scheme and provide an
exclusion not contained within the statutory language.""
Turning to Ballweg's assertion that Sherbert and Thomas
demonstrate that his refusal was constitutionally protected, the
court of appeals looked to Smith. Without delving into the
case's underlying rationale, the court applied a literal interpre-
tation of Smith. The court asserted that "the doctrine embodied
in these cases [Sherbert and Thomas] has not been extended by
the Supreme Court to invalidate any governmental action ex-
cept the denial of unemployment compensation.""4 Judge Bak-
er, writing for the court, adopted the Commission's questionable
distinction between unemployment compensation and workers'
compensation. Like the Commission, Baker focused on the
source of workers' compensation benefits, explaining that "un-
employment compensation payments are funded by taxes im-
posed on its citizens; workers' compensation benefits, however,
are paid by the employer or its insurance carrier from premi-
ums received from the employer.""5 Thus, ignoring the fact
that the state determines who is eligible to receive benefits, the
court of appeals affirmed the decision of the Workers' Compen-
sation Commission." 6
IV. THE VIRGINIA SUPREME COURT
Ballweg appealed his case to the Virginia Supreme Court."7
The court, citing Sherbert, Thomas, Hobbie, and Frazee noted
that the state may not refuse to grant unemployment compen-
112. Ballweg v. Crowder Contracting Co., 16 Va. App. 31, 34, 427 S.E.2d 731, 732
(1993).
113. Id. at 733.
114. Id. at 733 (citing Employment Div., Dept. of Human Resources v. Smith, 494
U.S. 872, 883 (1990)).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Ballweg v. Crowder Contracting Co., 247 Va. 205, 440 S.E.2d 613 (1994).
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sation benefits because a claimant's religion prohibits him or
her from accepting a particular job." 8
Finding Baliweg's situation more analogous to the unemploy-
ment compensation cases than to Smith, the court explained
that the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act could not be
"equated" with the type of statute involved in Smith."'
According to the court, Smith involved a neutral criminal stat-
ute of general applicability,, while the Virginia Workers' Com-
pensation Act is like the statutes in Sherbert, Thomas, Hobbie,
and Frazee in that it provides a system with individualized
exceptions. 2
Turning to the contention that because workers' compensation
funds derive from private sources, the system is beyond the
realm of First Amendment scrutiny, the court explained that
the source of funds was not determinative. 2' As the court
stated:
[Ilt is the Commonwealth's action in administering the Act,
not the method utilized to fund benefits, that forces the
claimant "to choose between fidelity to religious belief and
employment,'" and thereby "brings unlawful coercion to
bear on the [claimant's] choice." 122
After deciding that the Virginia Workers' Compensation
scheme was analogous to the unemployment compensation stat-
118. Id. at 209, 440 S.E.2d at 615.
119. Id. at 212, 440 S.E.2d at 618.
120. Id. at 212-13, 440 S.E.2d at 617-18. The court stated that it agreed with
Chief Justice Burger's statement in Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986):
The statutory conditions at issue in those cases [Sherbert and Thomas]
provided that a person was not eligible for unemployment compensation
benefits if, "without good cause," he had quit work or refused available
work. The "good cause" standard created a mechanism for individualized
exemptions. If a state creates such a mechanism, its refusal to extend an
exemption to an instance of religious hardship suggests a discriminatory
intent. Thus, as was urged in Thomas, to consider a religiously motivated
resignation to be "without good cause" tends to exhibit hostility, not neu-
trality toward religion .... In [Sherbert and Thomas], therefore, it was
appropriate to require the State to demonstrate a compelling reason for
denying the requested exemption.
247 Va. at 213, 440 S.E.2d at 618 (quoting 476 U.S. at 708).
121. Id. at 213, 440 S.E.2d at 618.
122. Id. at 213-14, 440 S.E.2d at 618 (quoting Frazee, 489 U.S. at 832).
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utes in Sherbert and its progeny and that the private nature of
workers' compensation benefits was not determinative, the court
applied the Sherbert compelling interest test. Noting that "only
those interests of the highest order ... can overbalance legiti-
mate claims to the free exercise of religion,"" the court found
that "[n]othing in the record suggests that the Commonwealth's
legitimate interest in administering the Act equitably and effi-
ciently would be thwarted by protecting Ballweg's sincerely held
religious beliefs."'24  Finding "no real distinction" between
Ballweg's dilemma and the Sherbert line of cases, the court
reversed the court of appeals. 125
This holding is correct. The Workers' Compensation Commis-
sion and the court of appeals essentially circumvented the prop-
er constitutional analysis of Ballweg's case. First, the Commis-
sion avoided the constitutional analysis by claiming that be-
cause the State did not provide the funding for Ballweg's bene-
fits, the State was not responsible for forcing Ballweg to choose
between his religion and benefits. 2 ' The court of appeals then
adopted this logic and also used it to distinguish Ballweg from
Sherbert and Thomas.127
This logic, as the Virginia Supreme Court found, is flawed.
By the Commission's admission, workers' compensation benefits
are "directed by the State."2 ' Because of this fact, it is irrele-
vant who directly pays for the benefits.
For example, in Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance
Co.,129 Wengler filed a claim to receive privately funded
workers' compensation benefits after his wife died in an indus-
trial accident."' Under the Missouri statute,"' widows
automatically qualified for benefits. A widower, however, could
not receive death benefits unless he was mentally or physically
123. Id. at 214, 440 S.E.2d at 618 (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215).
124. Id. at 214, 440 S.E.2d at 618.
125. Id. at 214, 440 S.E.2d at 619.
126. Ballweg, 71 O.W.C. at 280-81 (1992).
127. Ballweg, 427 S.E.2d at 733.
128. 71 O.W.C. at 280.
129. 446 U.S. 142 (1980).
130. Id. at 143.
131. Mo. REV. STAT. § 287.240 (Supp. 1979).
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disabled or proved that he was dependent upon his wife's
income."3 2
Wengler claimed that this administration of workers' compen-
sation benefits violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.'3 ' The Supreme Court agreed, stating
that "[it may be that there are levels of administrative conve-
nience that will justify discriminations that are subject to
heightened scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause, but the
requisite showing has not been made here ... ."1"
Thus, although dealing with workers' compensation, the Su-
preme Court applied the same constitutional analysis as if the
state provided the funds. The key, therefore, is that the state
decides who will receive the funds. Workers' compensation
funds are administered by state agencies under state law.
Therefore, the Virginia Supreme Court appropriately disregard-
ed the source of workers' compensation funding. In rejecting
Ballweg's argument under Sherbert and Thomas on the grounds
that Smith limited application of the Sherbert test to unemploy-
ment compensation cases, the court of appeals misinterpreted
the meaning of Smith.
The court of appeals failed to recognize the similarities be-
tween the case before it and Sherbert. In Smith, Scalia ex-
plained that application of the Sherbert test had been limited to
unemployment compensation cases because those cases "devel-
oped in a context that lent itself to individualized governmental
assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct.""5 Accord-
ing to Scalia, and as the Virginia Supreme Court recognized,
"where the State has in place a system of individual exemp-
tions" the Sherbert compelling interest test applies."1
6
As the Virginia Supreme Court found, the Virginia Workers'
Compensation Act meets the requirement of providing a system
of individualized exemptions. The Commission adjudicates dis-
putes that arise under workers' compensation law and adminis-
132. 446 U.S. at 143-46.
133. Id. at 146.
134. Id. at 152.
135. 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990).
136. Id.
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ters the rights guaranteed by the Act. 137 With regard to the
refusal of selective employment, the Commission, under certain
circumstances, exempts individuals from accepting selective
employment procured by the employer.' Therefore, because
the state provides a system for individualized exemptions, the
Virginia Supreme Court appropriately held that the Sherbert
test applies in Ballweg despite Smith.
However, even if there were no distinction between Ballweg
and Smith, with the passage of the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act the Sherbert strict scrutiny test would apply in
Ballweg regardless of whether a system of exemptions exists.
Therefore, the Virginia Supreme Court correctly applied the
standards of Sherbert and its progeny in Ballweg.
V. CONCLUSION
Ballweg's dilemma under the Virginia workers' compensation
law is strikingly similar to the situations in Sherbert, Thomas,
Hobbie, and Frazee. In all five cases, an individual was asked
to give up his or her religious convictions in order to receive a
benefit administered by the state. Each case involved a law,
neutral on its face and generally applicable, which when ap-
plied to the individual in question, burdened that individual's
free exercise rights. As the Court explained in Yoder, even if a
law is neutral on its face, its application can violate the Free
Exercise Clause.'39 In addition, all five cases involved is a
government agency that recognized the individual's religious be-
liefs as sincere, but determined that religious convictions do not
represent "good cause" or, as in Ballweg, a "justifiable" reason
for refusing to work.40 Certainly, granting an exemption in
Ballweg's situation would not lead to the administrative catas-
trophe contemplated in Lee any more than would the exemption
granted in employment cases.
137. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 65.2-200, 201 (1991).
138. See, e.g., Marrow v. Addington Beaman Lumber Co., Inc., 69 O.I.C. 195
(1990); Mullins v. Misener Marine Constr. Co., 69 O.I.C. 167 (1990); Seaborn v. Geor-
gia Pacific Corp., 68 O.I.C. 164 (1989); Wright v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 46 O.I.C. 265
(1964).
139. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
140. 71 O.W.C. at 281.
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Because of the foregoing similarities between Ballweg and
unemployment compensation cases, the Virginia Supreme Court
correctly found that the Workers' Compensation Commission's
application of Virginia Code Section 65.2-510 to Ballweg did not
pass strict scrutiny. Hence, there existed a burden on Ballweg's
religious conduct because he was forced to choose between his
religion and receiving benefits. Therefore, to deny Ballweg bene-
fits, it would have been necessary to have shown that there
was a compelling state interest and that there was not a less
restrictive means to achieve that goal. Because of the similari-
ties between Ballweg and the Sherbert line of cases and the
fact that the employer provided no evidence that any legitimate
interest of the Commonwealth would be threatened by granting
the exemption, the Virginia Supreme Court reached the ines-
capable conclusion that the refusal of workers' compensation
benefits to Ballweg violated his constitutional rights.
Virginia, therefore, recognized that religious conduct, under
certain circumstances, is entitled to First Amendment protec-
tion. A court should apply the Sherbert strict scrutiny test
when any statutory scheme allowing individualized exemptions
is applied in a way burdening an individual's free exercise
rights. Additionally, if the program provides benefits, a court
can find a government intrusion on First Amendment rights if
the state determines the recipients.
Because Virginia's workers' compensation system provides for
individualized exemptions and places the state in the position
of deciding who is entitled to them, the Virginia Supreme Court
etched a new justification for refusing employer procured selec-
tive employment into Virginia workers' compensation law.
Brydon DeWitt
19941 785

